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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 19091 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with attempted criminal 
nornicide, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. 76-5-201 ( 1978), aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1978), 
carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a Class "B" 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 
!lg78), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a jury trial on February 28, March 1 and 2, 
igs3, appellant was convicted on all charges in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Utah before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson. The trial judge sentenced appellant to the 
1nrleterminate term of not less than 1 nor more than 5 years at 
the lltah state Prison for the crime of attempted criminal 
r,.-,m1r1r1e; the indeterminate term of not less than 5 years to 
lite at the Utah State Prison for the crime of aggravated 
robbery; and the indeterminate term of from O to 6 months at 
the Utah State Prison for the crime of carrying a 
dangerous weapon, those sentences to run concurrently. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment and sentence below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 9, 1982 at approximately 4 :00 p.m., ,Jae' 
P. Hillard, a transient and sometime sheepherder (T. 8, 9, 10, 
41), returned from selling plasma to his campsite near Roper 
Yards at 3000 South 500 West in South Salt Lake City, lltah IT. 
5, 44). Shortly thereafter, appellant and another individual 
arrived at Mr. Hillard's campsite (T. 7, 8). Mr. Hillard and 
appellant conversed for a few minutes and the third person 
slept (T. 11). Appellant asked Mr. Hillard where his partner, 
Bill Southworth, was. Mr. Hillard replied that Mr. Southworth 
had not yet returned fran selling plasma (T. 12). 
A few minutes later, Mr. Hillard felt something in 
his back and turned to find appellant stabbing him (T. 13). 
Mr. Hillard reached for his back and connected with 
appellant's butcher knife and hand. Mr. Hillard tried to pull 
the knife out of his back (T. 14). Appellant next stabbed Mr 
-2-
,11 1 in the right chest area. When Mr. Hillard asked 
11 
Lint if he was trying to kill him, appellant made no 
r cid \' ( T. 16 ' 1 7 , 2 9 ) • 
Mr. Hillard was stabbed a third time by appellant on 
the left side of his stomach (T. 17). After Mr. Hillard fell 
t1• the ground, appellant went through his pockets and 
0 tr111Jglec1 to get Mr. Hillard's watch off his wrist, saying 
that he had to get it off (T. 21, 22). The watch has not been 
recovered. Appellant stabbed Mr. Hillard a fourth time, 
thnugh he has no recollection of that fourth stab (T. 30, 
l 2'> ) • 
As a result of this unprovoked attack, Mr. Hillard 
suffe reel a collapsed lung and lost 11 pints of blood, his left 
kidney, his spleen, and part of his pancreas and small 
intestine (T. 138, 143, 144). One wound came within fractions 
,,fan inch of piercing Mr. Hillard's heart (T. 139). 
A" "bout 5:30 p.m., Bill Southworth, Mr. Hillard's 
partner, retul'.ned to their campsite. He found Mr. Hillard on 
thf' grounrl, bleeding. Mr. Southworth called the police, who 
arrived along with paramedics shortly thereafter. Officer Leo 
Lindsay of the South Salt Lake Police Department assisted the 
paramedics and then questioned Mr. Southworth (T. 101, 102). 
Mr. Southworth reported that Mr. Hillard's green backpack 
3f•rear,,,1 to he missing from the campsite (T. 91, 105). 
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Officer Lindsay walked along the railroad tracks tr 
another hobo campsite at 3350 South (T. 105). He found 
appellant and two other men, one of whom had passed out (T. 
106). Officer Lindsay observed a green backpack behind 
appellant and asked him if it was his. Appellant said it was 
(T. 108 l. 
Officer Lindsay noticed blood on appellant's left 
side and coat. Appellant slowly moved the pack out of the 
officer's view with his left hand and moved his right hand 
under his jacket. Upon seeing this, Officer Lindsay brushed 
open appellant's coat and found a knife in a sheath, stuck in 
appellant's belt (T. 108, 109). Officer Lindsay arrested and 
handcuffed appellant and walked with him several blocks 
through a field to the officer's patrol car (T. 110, 117). No 
sobriety tests were given to appellant (T. 117, 180). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED BECAUSE APPELLANT MAKES NO 
REFERENCE TO THE RECORD SUPPORTING HIS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
In State v. Tucker, Utah, 657 P. 2d 755 ( 1982), this 
Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in part due to the 
appellant's failure to make any reference to the record in hie 
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otat»ment of the facts: 
A separate and independent basis for 
the affirmance of the trial court is that 
the defendant failed to refer to any 
port ion of the record that factually 
supports his contentions on appeal. This 
Court will assume the correctness of the 
judgment below if counsel on appeal does 
not comply with the requirements of Rule 
75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as to making a concise 
statement of facts and citation of the 
pages in the record where they are 
supported. 
Jd. at 756-757, citing Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 359, 
,'42 P.2d 297 (1957). See also State v. Vigil, Utah, 661 P.2d 
947, 948 (1983); State v. Steggell, Utah, 660 P.2d 252, 253 
Ilg 83). 
Appellant fails to refer to the record to support 
any of his factual statements. Thus, he has violated Rule 75 
lpl12ll2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the trial 
court's Judgment should be affirmed on that basis alone. 
POINT II 
THE STATE'S EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH THAT APPELLANT COMMITTED THE 
OFFENSE WITH THE REOUISITE INTENT. 
Appellant contends that his intoxicated condition 
prevented him from forming the requisite intent necessary for 
the commission of attempted criminal homicide. Utah Code Ann. 
' 7f>-2-3nh ( 1978) provides in pertinent part: 
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Voluntary intoxication shall not he a 
defense to a criminal charge unless such 
intoxication negates the existence of the 
mental state which is an element of an 
offense . 
Appellant was convicted of attempted criminal 
homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann. 76-5-201 (19781. 
Although criminal homicide covers various mental states, the 
requisite mental state for the attempted criminal homicide 
charged in this case was that appellant intentionally or 
knowingly attempted to cause the death of another. 
A person acts intentionally when it is his consciocs 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or to cause the 
result; a person acts knowingly when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. See Utah 
Code 76-2-103 (1) and (2) (1978). In State v. Murphy, 
Utah, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1983), this Court stated with 
reference to proof of intent: 
[I]ntent need not be proved by direct 
evidence. It- may be inferred from the 
actions of the defendant or from 
surrounding circumstances. 
The instant case is similar to the case of State \', 
Bush, Utah, 646 P.2d 748 (1982). In Bush, the defendant, 
while under the influence of alcohol, kidnapped several 
people, stole two cars, shot at one of the passengers in the 
-6-
he was driving, and engaged in a high speed chase with 
11 ce tiefore crashing and being apprehended. Two of those 
1 lnap!krl testified that during the ordeal the defendant spoke 
,oherently and followed directions without difficulty, despite 
rµferring to himself as a drunk-crazed murderer. The judge in 
a verdict of guilty of aggravated kidnapping, 
attemptPrl homicide and aggravated robbery. 
This Court noted that while the defendant may have 
heen intoxicated the evidence of his ability to communicate 
and make decisions was sufficient for the trial court to 
crJnclude that he was capable of forming the requisite intent 
fnr the crimes with which he was charged. Therefore, the 
1 erdict of the factfinder was affirmed. See also State v. 
<isneros, Utah, 631 P. 2d 856 ( 1981). 
On the facts presented in the present case, the 
iury, as trier of fact, could reasonably conclude appellant's 
intoxication did not negate his intent. Although appellant 
been drinking, he was coherent and could understand and 
fol low instruct ions. 
At trial, Mr. Hillard said that appellant had been 
rlrinking, but was not intoxicated (T. 42). Officer Lindsay 
'•h'1 harl been trained to spot intoxication, said appellant had 
'ieen "irinking, but was not intoxicated, did not have bloodshot 
''lPs, and was able to walk through a field and across railroad 
'"ds unassisted (T. 113, 116, 117, 129, 130, 200). 
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Officer Melvin Long testified that appellant had 
been drinking, but was not drunk (T. 201). Finally, Ser'J'"ant 
James Foster was of the opinion that appellant appeared t,, r"" 
intoxicated, but admitted having had very litte verbal ccintad 
with him. 
While there appears to be some discrepancy in the 
testimonies of Officers Lindsay and Long and Sergeant Foster 
as to whether or not appellant was intoxicated, this was a 
question for the jury to resolve. See State v. Mccullar, 
Utah, 674 P.2d 117, 118 (1983), where the Court said that 
"judging the credibility of the witnesses and weight of the 
evidence is exclusively the prerogative of the jury." 
The accounts of appellant's degree of intoxication 
are similar to those given in State v. Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 7; 
( 1982), where this Court held that the defendant was not 
entitled to an instruct ion on intoxication. Although there 
was evidence that the defendant had been drinking, there was 
no evidence that he was so intoxicated at the time of the 
crime that he was unable to form the intent necessary to prove 
robbery. 
This Court said in Wood, 648 P. 2d at 90, that in 
order for the defendant successfully to use the defense of 
intoxication, it would have been necessary to show that his 
mind had been affected to such an extent that he did not have 
the capacity to form the requisite intent. Appellant has not 
shown that there was such a significant impact on his capacit, 
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1 ,, reasnn, in the instant case. There is evidence that 
ldnt had been drinking, but no evidence that it affected 
, ,, 0 r11l1ty to form the necessary intent. 
The voluntary intoxication of appellant was not so 
pervasive as to negate the required intent for attempted 
er un i n a 1 h om i c i de • 
POINT III 
THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE T0 
SUSTAIN THE VERDICT OF GUILTY OF 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery in 
'Jiolation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-302 (1978). That statute 
reads in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery 
if in the course of committing robbery, 
he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife 
or a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
( 3) For the purposes of this part, an act 
sh al 1 be deemed to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission 
of, or in the immediate flight after the 
attempt or commission of a robbery. 
The State proved the elements of aggravated robbery at trial. 
Appellant stabbed Mr. Hillard with a knife which caused the 
,,,, 1rn serious bodily injury (T. 15, 136-146). Immediately 
-i 1 1 Pt' Stilhbing Mr. Hillard, appellant went through the 
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victim's pockets and took his watch (T. 20, 21). MnnPy that 
was found in possess ion of appellant had blood on it and "'"' 
similar in denomination to that which Mr. Hillard had in hi, 
pockets prior to the stabbing incident (T. 62, 173, 17q, 231, 
2 3 2). 
The last time Mr. Hillard had seen his green pacf, 
was prior to the stabbing, when it was in his camp (T. 341. 
When Mr. Southworth arrived at the campsite, the backpack was 
missing (T. 91). The next time the pack was seen it was in 
the possession of appellant, who cla"imed it was his and trie,J 
to hide it from Officer Lindsay {T. 108, 109). 
In State v. Mccullar, 674 P.2d at 118, this Court 
said that it would not overturn the jury's verdict "unless t,oe 
admissible evidence produced at trial is so lacking and 
unsubstantial that reasonable minds must necessarily entertain 
a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt." There is no 
question that Mr. Hillard was stabbed and seriously wounderl 
with a knife by appellant. Mr. Hillard's pack was seen in hl' 
camp just prior to appellant's attack. It was found shortly 
thereafter in appellant's possession. Based on this evidence, 
it was not unreasonable for the jury to believe that the pao, 
was taken by appellant after he stabbed Mr. Hillard. 
Appellant might contend that such reasoning convict' 
him on circumstantial evidence. However, as noted 
v. Clayton, Utah, 646 P.2d 723, 725 (1982), "circumstantial 
evidence alone may be competent to establish the guilt of t\f 
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'J"c ! " Thus, there was sufficient evidence to sustain 
'i eel L1 nt 's conviction of aggravated robbery. 
CONCLUSION 
There was sufficient evidence presented by the State 
to sustain the conviction of attempted criminal homicide. 
;rrel la nt, though somewhat intoxicated, was capable of forming 
ihP rPquisite intent for this crime. The State's evidence was 
s u ff i c i e nt 
rubbery. 
to sustain a verdict of guilty of aggravated 
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